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THE BARRIER
AGAINST TYRANNY

j

Speech of

Representative John Bell Williams
CD-Miss.)
In the United States
House of Representatives
January 25, 1956

LAWRENCE-GREENWOOO 67395

INTERPO:SITION:
The Barrier Against Tyranny
Mr. !S peaker, on May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court
of the United ,S tates drove a knife into the heart of
the American Constitution. On that date the Supren1e Court delegated unto itself and the Federal
Government ,c ertain powers in excess of those granted
under the Constitution. On that date, nine appointed
Justices assumed unto themselves the power to
amend the Constitution in the absence of approval by
the people 'Or the several States in the manner which
is provided in the Constitution. Wilfully and wantonly, they violated every principle of established
law. They usurped the legislative powers of the Congress, and contributed affirlnatively to the destruction of our dual sovereignty form of Government.
For purposes of this discussion, let us set aside
the emotional ,a nd political 'a spects .of the subject
matter involved in those decisions as well as the
merits or demerits ,o f racial segregation per se, and
consider instead the Constitutional crisis which the
people of the 48 States face as a result of the Court's
action.
For the States of this Union, north or south, to
permit the Supreme Court's brazen act of usurpation
to stand unchallenged is for them to surrender meekly their sovereignty to the Central Government. For
the States to permit their sovereignties to be so
usurped would be to provide the foundation on which
oligarchies are built.
Because some States do not have segregait ion laws,
their ,p eople may think that the Court's illegal ruling
is of no importance to them. They may even believe
conscientiously that the Federal Government would
be morally justified in the employment of its full
force and power against the Southern States in order
to compel integration of the races.
If they believe either, they a['e overlooking the
disastrous effects of the Court's action of May 17,
1954.
If the Supreme Court has the inherent right, under its judicial powers (which are not clearly defined
in the Constitution) to amend the Constitution in this
instance, the Court may likewise amend the Constitution by interpretation in cases affecting other
States, a'n d in matters equally as vital to theIne
Chief Justice John Marshall,. a Federalist himself,
whose opinions would certainly show him a believer
in a strong Central Government, once wrote this language into a decision.
"No political dreamer has ever been wild
enough to think of breaking down the
lines that sepaTate the ,S tates, or of compounding the American people into one
common mass."
In their attempt to destroy the lines that separate
the States and to compound the American people int'0 one 'c ommon mass, the present COUTt found it necessary to go outside the law. They found it necessary
to use, as the basis for their ruling, various sociological docwnents, some actually written by foreigners whose information on the subject was gained
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from abstract sources. The Black Monday decisions
violate every principle of established law. There is
no basis for such rulings in statutory law, nor can a
sUbstantial premise be found throughout the entire
history of Anglo-Saxon common law.
Mr. Speaker, let us recall for a moment why the
Constitution came into bein,g and how the Union was
formed. ,F rom a Convention of patriots representing
thirteen independent Colonies, there emerged a document forming a Federal Union,. The time was 1787;
the place, Philadelphia. After declarin,g theiT independence from the British Cro,w n, they recognized
the necessity for a common union or federation for
the mutual protection of all. Acting on this premise,
a convention was called to meet in Philadelphia in
the late spring of 1787. In attendance were lovers of
liberty who had made extreme sacrifices and endured
extraordinary hardships in their common resistance
to tyranny. The Colonies' independence had been
secured at a very high price: Death,. destruction, privation, bankruptcy, and a tragic war. The high price
paid for thek liberty was fresh in the minds of the
assembled patriots,.
In that convention each Colony voluntarily sur...
rendered to the Union certain powers which they regarded as necessary to the purposes: and functions of
the Central Government. These powers so surrendered were specifically enumerated and carefully limited. The individual States reserved to themselves. all
powers not expressly delegated t'O the Union nor prohibited to themselves in accordance with the ternlS
of their compact.
In spite of the cauti'Ous wotrding of the original
document, the States refused to ratify the Constitution until ample assurance was .given to the States
and the people that the 'C entral Government so created could never devour its creators, or deprive the
people of their "inalienable" rights. As a result, the
Bill of Rights, the first Ten Amendments were added
t'O the Consti tu tion.
These Ten Amendments did not expand the authority of the Central Government. On the contrary,
they further restricted its authority. Like the Ten
Commandments, our Bill of Rights are "Thou Shalt
Nots," directed to the Federal Government. They
shield the pe'Ople and the States from an oppressive
and tyrannical Government born of over-concentration of p'Owers. They were, and are now, the basis
for individual liberty and State sovereignty.
The Tenth Amendment clarified the matter of
delegated and reserved powers - in the simplest of
language. It reads:
"The powers. not delegated to the United
States by the 'C onstitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to. the people."
In elaborating 'On the Tenth Amendment, the Supre!ne Court said, in 1864:
"The reservation to the States respectively
can only mean the reservation of the rights
of sovereignty which they respectively
possessed before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States and which
they had not parted from by that instrument. And any legislation by Congress beyond the limits of the power delegated
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would be trespassing UPQn the rights of
the States OT the people and would nQt be
the supreme law of the land, but null and
vQid.{Gordon v. United S,t ates, 117 U.S.
697)."
In this particular case it he CQurt had reference to
an Act of Congress, but its, application is to the PQwer
of Federa'l Government. It follows, of CQurse, that
whichever branch of the Federal Govern,m ent goes
beyond the limits of the power delegated to' it is trespassing upon the rights Qf the States or the people
and such act is null and void. The Tenth Amendment
applies with equal force to all agencies of the Federal Government.
Mr. Speaker, for nearly a century and a half the
Supreme Court, the Congress and the Executive recognized that the power to segregate the races was
among the reserved powers of the States. Like the
police Po.wer, the power to. maintain and regulate
schools, the power to segregate the races was reserved to the States for the reason that it was nQt
specifically delegated to' CQngress nor prQhibited to'
the States in the CQnstitution.
The Supreme 'C ourt had many opportunities to
construe the meaning of the FQurteenth Amendment,
and did so on several occasions.
The Court consistently held that States must extend equal protection of their law to' all persons; but
not specifically the same p~rotection to' all persons.
The C-o urt's language was' never intended to prevent
reasonable classification as long as all classes were
treated alike. This was known as "separate but equal"
dQctrine. The present Court upset the historical findings of the Federal J udiciaxy in their decisiQn of May
17, 1954, by saying: "We conclude that in the field Qf
public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal'
has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
In the words Qf the Indianapolis Star, under date
Qf January 3, 1956:
"But we believe that in the issuance to t,h e
States, in the name of the Federal Government, Qfan oxder to cease the operation of
segregated schools, the Supreme Court exceeded the Constitutional authority of the
Federal Government.
"The single conclusion: on whic,h the Court
rested its assumption Qf this authority was,
after all, a shaky, one. It was, the Court's
arbitrary assertion, thereafter referred to'
as a fact, that separate schools: cannot possibly be equal. Carried to its logical conclusion, this means that Indianapolis Public 'S chools 80 and 84, to pick two at random, cannot be equal because they are
separate. TO' be sure they are sep,a rate on
the basis of pupils' addxesses rather than
race or some other ch,a racteristic. But they
are separate nonetheless, and pupils arbitrarily assigned to Qne or the other. Going
further, it could be said that if there are
two third-grade classes in- a given school,
they cannot be equal because they are separate. In short, if what the Supreme Court
asserted as a fact is indeed a fact, the only
community equality of educational opportunity is found in the one-room school! Yet
[4 ]
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on this premise the Court assumed application of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the States' operation of public school sys:tems."
Mr. Speaker, it is quite obvious that the Court
not only undertook to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment, which they have no right to do, but :they also
have rendered ,a decision which is utterly impossible
of enforcement.
Let us take a further look at the background of
the Black Monday decisions. The language of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the same as when it was
su,b mitted by Congress and ratified by the States.
The present Supreme Court would have us believe
that its meaning and intent has changed. This is not
true; it was never intended by the sponsors OT the
ratifying ,S tates that it should take from the Srt ates
their right to segregate the races in their public
schools and other local institutions. How can the
Court reconcile its interpretation of the intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment in face of the fact that the
very 'C ongress which submitted it to the States proceeded to provide for a segregated school system in
the District of Columbia, over which it exercises domain? How can they reconcile their position with the
fact that a great number of the ratifying States continued to maintain segregated school systems?
If the idea had ever been entertained that segregated schools were to be prohibited by the .operation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it stands to reason
that Congress and the States would have abandoned
their segregated school systems then and there. Certainly they would not have violated their own creature in the very act of creation.
The Constitution of the .S tate· of Mississippi was
adopted in 1890, and it provides for separate public
schools for the white ·a nd negro races. The question
of whether this provision was in conflict with the
Fourteenth Amendment was raised in the case of
Gon·g Lum vs. Rice (275 U.S. 78) before the S,u preme
Court in 1927. Chief Justice Taft, in deliverin'g the
Court's opinion, said:
''The right and p.ower of the State to regulate the method of providing for the education of its youth at public expense is
clear."
Previously, in the case of Cumming v. Richmond
County Board of Educa't ion, 175 U.S. 528, 545, the
Court had said, in an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice
Harlan:
"U·n der the circumstances disclosed, we
cannot say that the action of the State
Court was, within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a denial by the
.S ta te to the Plaintiffs * * * of the equal
protection of the laws, or of any privileges
belonging to them as citizens of the Uni.ted
States. We may add that * * III the education of the people in schools maintained
by State taxation is a matter belonging to
the respective States, * • *."
In the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S'. 53'7, 544,
545, the Court had held the "separate but equal" doctrine as being inconformity with the intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In that case, the 'C.ourt had
held that the establishment of separate schools for
[ 5]

white and colored children "has been held to be ·a
valid exercise of the legislative power even of Courts
of States where the political rights ·o f the colored race
have been longest and most rigidly enforced."
There is no doubt but that the Supreme Court has
the authority to construe the ' Constitution when the
issue is of first impression before the Court and there
is no legisJative history of the issue. But in the desegregation cases: there were a long line of Court
decisions, as well as ninety yeats of legislative history. In nearly three score cases, the Federal Judiciary has held to the separate bu1; equal maxim. For
nearly a century, the Congress and State Legislatures
made laws in reliance on the settled principle that
each State had the power to regulate its school system without interference by the Federal Government.
In effect, the Supreme Court has now ,a mended the
Constitution, taking from the States powers exercised
by them since the formation of the Union.
Only the people, acting through two-thirds of
their national representatives' and three-fourths of
their State Legislatures or ,S tate Conventions can
legally amend the Constitution. The Supreme Court
cannot lawfully do it. But if the Black Monday decisions ~e allowed to stand, it will have' been
amended.
If the Court is sustained in its continued usurpation of power, State boundaries will be erased and
the Constitution rendered meaningless.
On May 17 ,1954, the· Court did not suggest or
contend that the principle enunciated in Plessy v.
Ferguson, in ,C umming v. County Board of Education,
in 'G onig Lum v. Rice, and all the other cases were
bad decisions. The Court did not say they were erroneous interpretations of the Constitution. Instead,
the Court held that these . previous' decisions, were
bad "psychology" and errors in "sociology."
If we are to recognize the Supreme Court's Black
Monday decisions as valid and binding, then we must
als.o ·a ssume that the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution was repealed by the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. Certainly such was not the :intention of those who forced the Fourteenth Amendment through the Congress and subsequently fought
for its ratification by the States.
Is the Supreme Court of the United Sta,tes, consisting of nine men holding office by appointment, and
answerable not to' the people but to their respective
conscien'ces, if such they have, to exercise final and
absolute dominion .over every phase .of s.ociety? Are
they to be recognized as the sole and only judges of
the limits to which the Federal Agency may go in
the exercise of its powers, the Constitution to' the
contrary notwithstanding? Are we to assume that
the States and the people are helpless and with.out
recourse against uncO'ns:t itutional usurpatiO'ns of authority by the Federal establishment? Are the States
defenseless? Must they yield t.o Federal authority,
when the exercise or assumption of that authority is
beyond the limitatiO'ns imposed on the Federal establishment in the Constitution?
If these premises are to' be recognized as sound,
then we have already changed our form of GO'vernment, and no longer live under a Constitutional Republic. If these premises are sound,. we are wasting
th.e fruits of the peO'ples' labors in maintaining State
[6]

Governments and in supporting 'C ounty and Municipal Governments.
The Federal Government, being a creature of the
several States, through usurpation, is slowly but surely cannibalizing its creators, to the end that it and it
alone shall sit in exclusive judgment of the acts of the
citizens of the several States.
If an unlimited Central Government is to be according to the will of our people, then it should be
established by the people. The Court, an appointed
body, is clothed neither with the authority nor the
ability to speak for the people.
Look for a moment to the Declaration of Independence, which holds that Government derives its
just powers from the consent of the governed. In elaborating further on this doctrine, the Declaration of
Independence warns us as follows:
"Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established s:h ould not be
changed for light and transcient causes;
and accordingly all experience hath shown
that mankind are more disposed to suffer
while evils are sufferable, than to right
themselves by abolishing the forms to
which they are accustomed. But when a
long train of abuses, and usurpations * • •
evinces a design to reduce them underr absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their
duty, to throw off such government, and to
provide new guards for their future security."
These wo~ds were directed to the King of England
and the tyranny of his regime, of course. Not the
least among their grievances was the assertion:
"He (the Kin'g) has combined with others
to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to
our constitutions and un'a cknowledged by
our laws, giving his assent to their pretended acts of legislation • • • for taking away our charters, abolishing our most
valuable laws, and altering fundamentally
the forms of cur governments; for suspending our legislatures, and declaring
themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever. • • •
In every state of these oppressions we
have petitioned for redress in the most
humble terlns: Our repeated petitions
have been answered only by ;repeated inj.uries."
Today, the people of the S:o uthern States suffer
oppression at the hands' of an irresponsible Supreme
Court. We have seen that Court arbitrarily void
provisions of our Charters; they have abolished some
of our most valuable laws, and they have virtually
declared themselves invested with power to legislate
for us in all cases.
Yes, Mr. Speaker, we in the States have petitioned
again and again to this Court for redress, but the
Court turns a deaf ear to our pleas, choosing instead
to harken to the cons,c ienceless demands of minority
pressure groups seeking political favor, and to whom
the preservation of Constitutional Government is a
matter of neither moment nor consequence.
Annually we gather in ,t his Chamber for a reading
of Washington's F,a rewell Address to Congress. We
[7]
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accord the readmg of this document the proper outward reverence and honor which it certainly deserves, and we can do no less. Many hear its reading,
but few listen to the words or attempt to grasp its
profound meanings.
If one listens closely to the next re.a ding of this
monumental message, he will he,a r this admonition to
all who shall live under the Constitution of the
United States:
"The Constitution which at any time exists till changed by an explicit -a nd authentic act of the whole people is sacredly obligatory upon all. * * * But let there be
no change by usurpation; fOir though this
in one instance may be the instrument of
good, it is the customary weapon by which
free governments are destroyed."
As God-fearing people, we are obligated to resist
tyranny, no matter what fornl it may take. If we are
true to ourselves, we must resist it even when it
wears the sheep's clothin'g. of judicial robes, if freedom- is to be the lega'c y we leave to our children.
The resolving of this crisis does not call for complacency, timidity, or cowardice. It will call for
taxing new reservoirs of courage, and will dem-a nd
sacrifices that will test the strength of our convictions. In the face of the Supreme Court's brazen
usurpation of authority, its flagrant disregard of Constitutional limitations, its wilful flauntin'g of judicial
precedents, its wanton ·c ontempt for the doctrine of
stare decisis and recognized principles of established
law, we must resort to drastic measures if we are to
preserve the structure of our Republic. This will
mean suffering and sacrifice on the pea rt of libertyloving Americans, and it means seizing the offensive
from the conscienceless self-seeking elements who
seek to destroy our Republic. It means that we must
seek and find the courage that distin'g uished our
. gJ."eat American ancestors in their struggle to build
this Republic, and there can be no retreating from
principle for an~ cause whatsoever.
Mr. iS peaker, inasmuch as the Federal Government
is a creatUire of the States, it is ·t he solemn duty of
the ,S tates to protect themselves from encroachments
upon their sovereignty. No machinery for this is set
up in the Constitution. No relief is available in the
statutes. Yet the law teaches u.s that for every wrong
there must be a remedy.
The Black Monday decisions of the Federal Judi- ·
ciary go beyond the limits of delegated powers and
therefore are an invasion of powers reserved to the
States, but ,t he States have a remedy. It was first used
by Geor.gia in the 1790's. It was used by Kentucky
and Virginia in the same decade. Other States used
it in the Nineteenth Century. Jefferson, Madison and
Calhoun were its authors and originators. It was
called the Doctrine of Interposition.
In the words of Jefferson from the Kentucky Resolutions:
"Resolved, that the several States composing the United States of America are
not united on the principle of unlimited
submission to their general Government;
but that by compact under the style and
title of a Constitution for the United States
and of amendments thereto, they consti[8]

tuted a general Government for special
purposes, delegated to that Government
certain definite powers, .reserving each
State to itself, the residuary mass' of right
to their own self-government; and that
whensoever the General Government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void and of no force:
"That to thiscoIDpact each State acceded
as a State, and is an integral party, its coIS tates forming as to itself, the other party:
'''That the Government created by this
pact was not made the exclusive or final
judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself, since that would have made
its discretion and not the Constitution the
measure of its powers; but that as in all
other cases of compact am~)ll!g parties havin;g no common judge, each party has an
eq ual ri,g h t to judge for itself, as well of
infractions as of the mode and measure
of redress * • •."
In the words of M,a dison (Committee Report on
the Virginia Resolutions):
"It appears It o your committee to be a
plain principle, founded in common sense,
illustrated by common practice, an,d essential to the nature of compacts, that where
resort can be had to no tribuJ?,al superior to
the au thori ty of the parties, the parties
themselves must be made the rightful
judges, in the last resort, whether the bargain has been pursued or violated.
"The Constitution of the United States
was formed by the sanction of the States,
given by each in its sovereign capacity.
It adds to the stability and dignity, as well
as to the authority of the Constitution, that
it rests 'On this legitimate and solid foundation.
•

"The S ta tes, then, being the parties to the
Constitutional compact, and in their sovereign capacity, it follows of necessity that
there can be no tribunal above their authority to decide, in the last resort, whether the compact made by them be violated;
and, consequently, that, as the parties to
it, they must decide themselves, in the
last resort, such questions as may be of
sufficient magnitude to require their interPOS!"t"Ion . . . . "
In the words of Calhoun:
"This right of interposition, thus solemnly
asserted by the State of Virginia, be it
called what it may~State-right, veto, nullification, or by any other name I conoeive to be the fundamental principle of
our system, resting on facts historically as
certain as our revolution itself, and deduc- .
tions as simple and demonstrative as that
of any political or moral truth whatever;
and I firmly believe that on its recognition
depends the staJbility and safety of our poIitical institutions. . . ."
[9]

None can say that these three great statesmen
were advocating anything but preservation of the
Constitution and the Union. They had contributed as
much, if not more, than all their contemporaries to
the creation of this Republic. Certa.inly their philosophy and their interpretation of Constitutional limitations should be given credence today, when the
relationship
of
the
Federal
Union
to
the
States
is
in
•
lssue.
The right of the States to check encroachments of
the Federal Government must, of necessity, be an
integral part of our system of dual sovereignty, and
vice versa.. What happens when a State encroaches
on the Federal Government's delegated powers? The
Federal Government immediately interposes its sovereignty between the encroachment and the citizens
affected. Does anyone believe that our Founding
Fathers would confer such power on the creature and
withhold it from the creator? No, Mr. Speaker, the
principle of interposition is a fundamental part of ou["
system of dual sovereignty. The right of interposition
should be reserved for use only when there is-a deliberate, palpable and dangerous usurpation of the sovereign States' powers.
A precedent in American history, when interposition was carried to its logical conclusion, occurred in
Georgia.
Georgia and the Supreme Court, 1792-3

The issue in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia was
the right of the S,u preme Court to hear cases in which
a State was sued by 'a citizen of another State. Chisholm, a citizen of South C,a rolina, sued Georgia to
recover some lands confis'c ated during the Revolutionary War.
Georgia refused to recognize the competence of
the Supreme Court to hea([' the case, and when the
case came to the Court in 1792, Georgia declined to
enter an appearance, but merely submitted a written
remonstrance against the jurisdiction of the Court.
In 1793, the Supreme Court ordered Georgia to appear under penalty of a judgment by default for Chisholm. Georgia maintained its defiance and a writ of
inquiry was awarded for Chisholm.
The writ was never executed and Georgia succeeded in its defiance of the Court. Opposition to the
Cour.t's assumption of jurisdiction was intense in
Georgia (the ,S tate House of Representatives passed a
bill declaring it a felony punishable by death for
anyone to attempt to exe,c ute any compulsory process
issuing from the Supreme Court in this case) and
widespread in the other States. On the day after the
Court's decision was announced, a Constitutional
Amendment was introduced in Congress to prevent a
State from being sued in the Federal courts. The
Eleventh Amendment, which reverses the decision in
Chisholm v. Georgia, was finally ratified in 1798.
Thelre were .other cases where the right of interposition was imposed, but they turned .into open defiance and were never followed through to their logical conclusion. Several interposition resolutions lay
inactive or were withdrawn without following the
amendment process. Othelrs were not followed through
because the legislation protested was amended, or
repealed by Congress. Notable examples of the latter
are the interposition resolutions of many northern
[ 10]

States in the matter of the Fugitive Slave Law, and
South Carolina on the Tariff issue. Cases are cited
below-not as examples of complete interposition,
but as examples of the forms of interposition that
have occurred in American history.
Pennsylvania and the Federal CourisThe Case of the Sloop Active
This conflict between the Pennsylvania and Federal Government originated in the Revolutionary
War. The sloop Active was captured during the War
and sold. The Pennsylvania Court of Admiralty ruled
that the proceeds belonged to the captors, but the
owners of .the ship appealed to the Conltinerutal Congress, which, through its Committee on Appeals, reversed the State court. The ruling of the Committee
on Appeals was ignored.
Almost twenty years later, Olmsted, the owner,
applied to it he Federal District Court for a process to
enforce the ;r uling of the Committee on Appeals. In
1803 ,F ederal District Judge Peters ruled that the
money be paid to Olmsted, but he was defied by the
State and his: decree was not enforced. Olmsted applied to the Supreme Court, which in 1809 issued a
writ of mandamus directing the enfoT'c ement of the
District Court's decree.
When the S·u preme Court's decision was announced, the Governor notified the Legis'l ature that
be proposed to call out the· State militia to prevent the enforcement of the Court's decree. The Federal marshal attempted to serve ~ocess on the State
Treasurer, but was stopped by the State troops. However, the marshal declared his intention to callout a
posse in order to enforce his authority.
At the last moment the State backed down. The
process was served and the Legislature appropriated
the money to pay Olmsted's claim. As a final humiliation, the General of the State militia was convicted
in Federal Court for forcibly resisting the Federal
marshal. He was, however, pardoned by President
Madison almost immediately afterwards.
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Couri-Martin v. Hunter's Lessee

This conflict between Federal and State authorities arose out of litigation to deterlnine the title to
certain lands in Virginia. The history of the litigation
and the issues of law involved are very complex, but
do not need to be described in an account of· the conflict between the two courts.
In 1810, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that
Martin's claim to the lands in issue was not valid
because of Virginia statutes restricting the Tights of
aliens to inherit land within the Commonwealth. A
writ of error to the Supreme Court was, however,
allowed and that Court reversed the Virginia decision and entered an order requiring the Virginia
Court of Appeals to enter judgment for Martin.
The Virginia cowrt refused to comply with the
mandamus from the Supreme Court. Their refusal
was based on the independency of the State jUdiciary.
The Virginia court acknowledged the supremacy
clause of the Constitution, but denied that this involved the supremacy of the Federal courts.
[ 11 ]
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After the Virginia court's refusal to implement
the Supreme Court's decision, the case weni back to
the Supreme Court on the sole issue of that Court's
power to secure compliance with its decisions. Compliance was secured by sending the case back to the
lower Virginia court in which it had originated and
which enforced the Supreme Court's decision.
Connecticut and the Embargo Act, 1809
The Embargo Act was passed by Congress in 18Q7
and led to much discontent in the New England
States. Many memorials against the act were passed,
but Con1gress ignored the protests and in 1809 passed
a stringent enforcement act.
Connecticut refused to cooperate in the enforcement of this act ,a nd the General Assembly in special
session resolved "That to preserve the Union, and
support the Constitution of the United States, it becomes the duty of the Legislatures of the States, in
such a crisis of affairs, vigilantly to watch over, and
vigorously to maintain, the powers not delegated to
the United ,S tates, but reserved to the States respectively, or to the people; and that a due regard to this
duty, will not permit this Assembly to assist, or conCUT in giving effect to this unconstitutional act, passed, to enforce the embargo.
The extent of the opposition to the embargo caused
Congress to repeal it within a year of this protest.
Ohio and :the Nationcvl Bank
In 1819 Ohio placed a tax of $50,000 on every
branch of the Bank of the United States within its
borders in order to drive it from the State. Despite
the Supreme Court decision in McCullough. v. Maryland, which had declared such a tax unconstitutional,
Osborn, the State Auditor, determined to collect the
tax. He was enjoined from collecting the tax by the
Circuit Court, but nevertheless proceeded to take it
by force from one of the branches of the bank. The
Ohio Legislature supported Osborn in a series of resolutions objecting to the doctrine that the States are
bound on questions of constitutionality by S·u preme
Court decisions. The Legislature also passed an "Act
to withdraw from the Bank of the United States the
protection of the laws <>f this Starte" as a further way
of seeking to expel the bank which had been supported by the Supreme Court.
The bank instituted pToceedinlg s against Osborn
and in 1824 the S,u preme Court affirmed a lower court
decision aga~nst him. The tax money was refunded to
the bank.
Georgia and :the Indians
In the 182.o's Georgia' became dissatisfied with the
slowness of the Federal Government's removal of the
Creek Indians from Georgia territory. Governor
Troup charged the Federal Goverrunent was failing
to carry out its promises and ordered a Starte survey
of the lands. President Adams threatened to use the
army to stop the 'G eorgia surveyors, but Governor
Troup successfully defied him. The issue was settled
by
the
withdrawal of :the Creeks beyond the Missis•
•

SIppI.

At the same time as the Creek controversy, Georgia also took over the lands of the Cherokees within
its borders. The Cherokee laws were annulled and
[ 12 ]
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Georgia statutes enforced in the territory. This controversy went to the Supreme Court when a C·h erokee
was convicted under Georgia la,v and sentenced to
death. The Supreme Court granted a writ of error,
but it was ignored and the Cherokee was executed.
At least two other cases arising out of the Georgia
statutes regulating the Cherokee lands were appealed
to the ,S upreme Court. In both, the Court ruled against
the State, but in each case the State authorities ignored all communications from the Court and the
criminal penalties awarded by the Georgia courts
were carried out.
Nullification in South Carolina
Opposition to the protective tariff increased in
South Carolina throughout the 1820's. The 1828 "Tariff of Abominations" produced a formal protest from
the State Legislature and nullification sentiment increased for the next four years. The tariff of 1832
did not alleviate the situation and in the fall of 1832
the ,S tate Legislature issued a call for a State convention. The convention met in November, 1832, and
passed an Ordin'a nce of Nullification that declared the
protective tariff unconstitutional and authorized the
Legislature to take all steps necessary to prevent the
enforcement of the ta,r iff acts as from February, 1833.
President Jackson responded with a message declaring that he would enfotr'c e the tariff with all the
means at his dispos'a l and a "Force Bill" was introduced in Congress.
T.he Force Bill was passed, together with a com...
promise tariff act that was acceptable to South Carolina. The South Carolina con~ention reassembled in
March, rescinded its ·nullification act against the tariff, but passed an Ordinance of Nullification against
the Force Act.
Fugitive Slaves and Personal Laws
The Federal Fugitive S,l ave Act of 1793 caused
opposition from States in which abolitionist sentiment was strong. The Act relied on State officers to
enforce its provisions and several States passed laws
extending the right of jury trial to suspected fugitive slaves. Such laws were passed in Indiana
(1824), Connecticut (1838), Vermont (1840), and ' New
York (1840). Though these laws were not direct challenges to Federal authority, they undoubtedly were
designed to hinder the operation of the Federal
statute.
The situation was altered by the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania.
The significant portion of the decision was the ruling
that State officers could not be compelled to. enforce
a Federal s,t atute. As a direct result four States (Massachusetts, Vermont, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island)
passed laws prohibiting State officers from perforlning the duties assigned to them under the law of 1793
and alsO' forbidding the use of 'S tate jails for fugitive
slaves.
A new Federal Fugitive Slave Act was passed in
1850 which did not rely on State officers for its enforcement. Personal liberty laws providing s'a feguards for the fugitive slave and makinlg the enforcement of the law more difficult were passed in ten
States (Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Michigan, Maine, Wisconsin, Kansas, Ohio,
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and Pennsy1vania) .
The most positive defiance of the Federal Government on the fugitive slave issue occurred in Wisic onsin in the 185.o's. Sherman Booth, an abolitionist editor, was arrested for forcibly rescuing a fugitive
slave. The State Supreme Court released him on a
writ of habeas corpus and at the same time held the
Federal Fugitive Slave Law unconstitutional. However, Booth was indicted and convicted in the United
States District Court only to have the State Supreme
Court again release him. In 1855 the Supreme Court
issued a writ 'Of error, but the Wisconsin court ignored it and refused to send a copy of its record.
The Supreme Court managed to procure a copy
of the record in 1857 and in 1858 reversed the judgment of the Wisconsin COUTt. The State courts refused
to enforce the verdict, but Booth was arrested by a
United ,S tates marshal in 1860. He was rescued, rearrested, and finally pardoned by President Buchanan
in the same year.
'TIhe South Carolina Nullification Resolution of
183'2 nullified a revenue act designed to finance the
United States Government. The revenue act was
clearly within the delegated powers of the Congress,
and was an act which it was constitutionally empowered to pass. There was no. question in this case but
that the act was constitutional.
Following the adoption by South Carolina of its
nullification resolution, the Legislatures of the States
of Mississippi, Alabama, North Carolina an,d Virginia
adopted resolutions taking exceptions to South Carolina's right thus to nullify a legal and constitution~l
act of Congress. Even so, South Carolina won a distinct victory by her act of nullification.
I do not contend, in spite 'Of this precedent, that a
State can nullify an act which C'o nig ress has the con...
stitutional right to pass. No State can legally void
actions of the Federal Government when those actions are clearly within the scope of powers delegated
to the Federal Government by the Constitution. If
such acts could be so nullified, we would have no effective Federal Government, of course.
But, Mr. Speaker, this is not the case presented by
the May 17, 1954, decision. In the present case, the
Supreme Court is clearly attempting to destroy the
Constitution itself. It has made an abortive attempt
to amend the Constitution. It is attempting to nullify
the powers reserved to the States under the Constitution. Through acts of interposition, the States \vould
merely be seeking to nullify the action of the nullifiers.
.
By design, the Supreme Court has committed a
deliberate, palpable, and dangerous invasion of the
field of sovereignty ex·c lusively reserved to the
States. The nine Justices have committed an act of
treason against the Constitution of the Uni!t ed States.
It is the duty of the States, in the face of such flagrant and illegal assumption of power by the Federal
judiciary, to interpose their sovereignty and nullify
the decision. In doing so, the States are protecting
the Constitution against nullification by the Courts,
and are protecting the liberties of the American
people .
.The time is at hand when the States must reassert
their constitutional rights or suffer their own de[ 14 ]

struction. The zero hour f'Or Sit ate Governments has
arrived, and it might well be the zero hour, also, for
our Republican form of Government.
Mr. Speaker, I have heard many say that they
favor interposition, but are opposed to nullification.
This is the same thing as saying that we favor the
aiming and firing of our guns but we are against hitting the target.
The very purpose of interposition is to nullify. If
that is not to be rthe purpose, the act of interposition
becomes merely an expression of disfavor and is
meaningless.
Mr. ·S peaker, interposition is the act by which a
State attempts to nullify. Interposition without nullification is a knife without an edge, a gun with'Out
bullets, a car with'Out an engine, a body without a
life.
If the fStates are to preserve their sovereignties, if
they are to preserve the Constitution, they must interpose and declare the Black Monday decisions to be
illegal and invalid and 'Of no force and effect within
the territorial limits of their respective jurisdictions.
This position I believe the ·S tates have the right and
duty to take and to maintain until such time as this
question of contested powers has been settled legally
and finally by constitutional amendment. ..
Mr. Speaker, the South desires nothing more or
less than its right to order and control its own affairs
within the limitations of its constitutional prerogatives. · The Southern .States will not submit to judicial
tyranny any more than our sister States will s-anction
illegal usurpations of their sovereignty. In seeking
relief from the oppression of this decision, we must
and will calIon our sister ·S tates for their support to
the end that the sovereign rights afall the States shall
be preserved.
Mr. Speaker, while the Black Monday decisions
constitute the basis for our present grievance, it might
be well for the ,S tates of this Union to take stock of
other usurpations of their sovereign powers. Treatymaking powers, taxing p'Owers, the interstate commerce clause and Government con1petition with private enterprise have all been, in recent years, the
subject of frequent abuse by the three branches of
the Federal Government. If we are to n1.aintain our
present form of Government, . the tilne is at hand
when the States should take action, also, to re-define
delegated and reserved powers.
Again I emphasize that public school segregait ion,
as vital as it is to the people of my State and the
South, is but part of the all-embracing problem
brought on by the Black Monday decisions. There
have been deliberate, palpable, and dangerous encroachments in other fields. The trend toward centralization of power into the hands of the few was
merely stabilized and amplified by the Black Monday decisions. It is quite apparent that we can expect
more and more such abortive invasions of State sovereignties, and more and more usurpation 'Of power
by the Federal establishment. The question of \vhether the States are sovereign in the matter of reserved
powers should be settled now, once and for all.
What will be the object of the Supreme Court's
next act 'Of usurpation? What among Jefferson's "inalienable rights" will be next to suffer destruction by
judicial legislation?
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Will it be the police power of the States? Intrastate transportation and commerce? Will it be State
and local regulatory powers. Will it be property
rights, marriage laws, contract laws, criminal laws?
If we surrender to this trend, where will it end: Can
anyone say?
In discussing the unsurrendered powers of the
States, the Court, in 1911, said:
"Among the powers of the State not surrendered-which power therefore remains
with the State-is the power to regulate
the relative rights and duties of all within
its jurisdiction as to guard the public morals, the public safety, and the public
health,as well as to promote the public
convenience and the common good." (Chicago, et al v. McGuire, 219 I.S. 549.)
Will this be the next principle of Constitutional
Government to feel the axe of the Court's usurpation?
We know not which principle of Constitutional
Government will be next to be attacked. Therefore,.
the people are entitled to know whether the Statess-the original source of all Federal authority~r the
Federal Government itself is to be the final and supreme arbiter of the extent of delegated and reserved
powers under our Constitution.
Jefferson once said: "Timid men * * ( prefer . . . __
the calm of despotism to the boisterous sea of liberty."
He said "The God that gave us life gave us liberty
-..
at the same time: The hand of force ,m ay destroy, but
cannot disjoin them." It was his creed that resistance
to tyranny. was obedience to God..
Mr. Speaker, the s;a me God that watched over
Jefferson, and inspired him to swear etern'a l hostility
to tyranny watches over us. With His Divine guidance and help, we shall not fail.
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